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P  R  0  T  E  C T  I  0  N  I  S  M 
Nostalgic  references  are  nowadays  being  made  to  the  liberal 
era  of  the  60's  and  the  early  70's.  It  is  claimed  that 
the  open  international  trading  order  has  been  slowly  dis-
integrating  over  the  past  five  years  or  so.  Protectionism 
has  allegedly  increased  such  that  parallels  are  drawn  with 
the  early  30's. 
All  this  is  hardly  justified.  During  the  great  depression 
trade  contracted  by  over  25  X  in  a  few  years.  The  fall  in 
world  trade  volume  in  82-83  has  been  of  the  order  of  2  X. 
World  production  has  contracted  much  more.  In  the  first  half 
of  this  year  world  trade  was  again  rising  strongly. 
In  reality  the  "ideal  trade  conditions  of  the  60's"  have 
never  existed.  The  international  economic  system  has  always 
had  numerous  warts  and  blemishes.  Balance  of  payments  import 
restrictions  and  exchange  controls  have  for  long  been  the 
norm  rather  than  the  exception,  and  central  planning  widespread. 
In  the  trade  policy  field,  there  have  for  several  decades 
been  restrictions  and  distortio~ in  a  number  of  areas; 
textiles  and  clothing  since  1962;, steel  - eg.  self-restraints 
by  the  E.E.C.  and  Japan  vis-a-vis  the  U.S.A.  from  1969  to 
1974  and  by  Japan  vis-a-vis  the  E.E.C.  -;  specialty  steel 
quotas  in  the  70's;  restrictions  against  Japanese  cars; 
and  shipbuilding  subsidies. 
Up  to  the  end  of  1967,  before  the  beginning  of  the  staged 
implementation  of  the  Kennedy  Round  cuts,  customs  duties 
in  most  developed  countries  were  comfortably  high.  To  take 
a  few  simple  examples  :  customs  duties  on  passenger  cars 
were  35  X  in  Japan,  22  X  in  the  E.E.C.,  6,5  X  in  the  U.S.A.· 
and  17,5  X  in  Canada.  On  polyethylene  they  were  20  X  or  over 
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in  all  these  countries.  On  silk  ties  the  corresponding  figures 
were  closer  to  30  X.  This  in  itself  made  it  easier  to  dispense 
with  non-tariff  barriers.  While  trade  liberalisation  has  made 
progress  in  the  less  important  agricultural  products  and 
processed  foodstuffs,  trade  in  the  major  agricultural  products 
of  the  temperate  zone  has  largely  escaped  the  liberalisation 
progress.  In  the  developing  countries  trade  policies  ha·ve 
always  been  highly  protectionist,  with  less  than  a  handful 
of  countries  following  liberal  policies. 
Today  industrial  countries  have  reduced  tariffs  to  unpre-
cedentedly  low  levels  - indeed  staged  tariff  cutting  under 
the  Tokyo  Round  continues  until  1986- and  they  have  gone 
even  further  in  the  framework  of  the  Generalised  System  of 
Preferences.  A number  of  codes  such  as  those  on  customs 
valuation  and  government  procurement  and  subsidies  and 
countervailing  duties  were  negotiated  in  t979  to  supplement 
the  rules  of  G.A.T.T.  thereby  tightening  up  the  obligations 
of  the  signatories,  and  other  provisions  such  as  those 
dealing  with  dispute  settlement,  balance  of  payments  difficult-
ies  and  less  developed  countries  have  been  clarified.  In  the 
regional  context,  free  trade  has  been  achieved  in  Western 
Europe  in  industrial  products  and  the  Community  has  gone 
a  long  way  to  grant  full  free  access  to  the  Lome  countries, 
and  substantial  tariff  disarmament  to  practically  all  the 
Mediterranean  nations. 
The  "great  recession"  and  the  behaviour  of  exchange  rates 
have  in  recent  years  imposed  enormous  strains  on  the  trading 
system.  The  world  trading  order  has  withstood  the  pressures 
surprisingly  well.  It  has  not  disintegrated.  Creeping  protect-
ionism  has  been  eroding  the  progress  achieved  in  some  areas 
but  modest  liberalisation  in  other  areas  has  worked  the  other 
way  thereby  compensating  to  a  degree  the  regression  elsewhere • 
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Where  has  the  slippage  into  p~otectionism occurred  and  what 
form  has  it  taken  ? 
The  picture  of  textiles  and  clothing  needs  to  be  carefu{ly 
analysed.  Total  imports  from  the  developing  world  into  the 
industrial  countries  have  continued  to  grow  at  a  significant 
pace,  and  both  the  commodity  coverage  and,  even  more  so, 
the  exporting  country  coverage  of  the  restrictions  applied 
under  the  M.F.A.  have  expanded.  On  the  other  hand,  for  the 
major  suppliers  this  meant  that  their  room  for  expansion 
had  been  curtailed  and  growth  had  been  lower.  This  double 
process  corresponds  to  the  broadening  pattern  of  product 
lines  and  the  rapid  increase  in  the  number  of  developing 
countries  which  have  set  up  export  industries  in  this  area. 
If  the  major  exporters  now  have  less  scope  to  switch  to  new 
unrestricted  process  lines,  their  process  of  upgrading  will 
receive  an  additional  stimulus.  Some  other  suppliers  might 
join  in  this  process  on  certain  products,  once  their  quotas 
tend  to  be  fully  shipped.  The  result  is  that  while  there 
are  admittedly  more  restrictions  in  this  area,  the  volumes 
and  patterns  of  developed  countries  imports  have  expanded 
considerably.  Imports  from  the  developing  countries  increased 
froD  7.3  percent  of  apparent  consumption  in  the  developed 
countries  in  1973,  to  17.4  percent  in  1981.  The  share  of 
developing  countries  in  world's  exports  of  textiles  went  up 
from  30  %  in  1963  to  34  %  in  1982.  The  corresponding 
figures  for  clothing  were  respectively  15  %  and  48  %. 
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Steel  is  another  trouble  area  with  a  wide  and  broadening 
variety~of  gimmicks  interfering  with  the  free  flow  of  trade. 
A downward  trend  in  steel  consumption  in  the  developed  world 
combined  with  recession  and  new  steel  plants  in  a  number  of 
NICs  - which  for  the  time  being,  because  of  the  recession, 
have  export  availabilities- is  forcing  painful  contraction 
and  modernization  of  the  steel  industry  in  the  whole  indust-
rialized  world.  But  world  trade  in  steel  is  still rising, 
and  production  capacity  in  the  developed  world  together  with 
employment  have  been  shrinking  fast. 
The  shoe  industry  is  another  case  of  a  shift  in  comparative 
advantage  which  has  led  to  open  and  hidden  protectionist 
measures.  One  might  note,  however,  a  number  of  cases  where 
governments  have  refused  extra  protection  to  their  producers. 
Here  again  trade  continues  to  grow  rapidly. 
In/ 
the  car  sector,  the  restrictions  are  practically  concentrated 
against  exports  by  Japan.  Disregarding  inflation,  exports 
of  O.E.C.D.  countries  in  passager  cars  has  risen  from  g  4.3 
billion  in  1965  to  g  59  billion  in  1982. 
Finally  there  are  a  number-of  other  sectors,  inter  alia  in 
the  consumer  electronics  area,  where  new  restrictions  have  been 
introduced  but  not  in  as  systematic  a  way  as  in  textiles  or 
clothing,  nor  in  the  same  context  as  in  steel.  International 
trade  is  expanding  by  leaps  and  bounds. 
In  agriculture  the  picture  has  not  really  changed  over  the 
last  decade.  The  degree  of  trade  tensions  in  the  area  of 
temperate  agriculture  products  fluctuates  with  the  overall 
supply/demand  situation. 
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A meaningful  quantification  of  all  these  restrictions  is 
well-nigh  impossible  not  so  much  because  of  the  lack  of 
transparency  as  is  all  too  frequently  asserted,  but  much 
more  because  of  the  very  complex  and  diversified  nature 
of  the  measures.  It  is  clear,  for  example,  that  the  amount 
of  trade  suppressed  in  the  case  of  Japanese  car  exports  is 
substantial  but  in  other  areas  when  the  restraint  invol~es 
so-called  "weather  forecasts"  or  other  kinds  of  export 
restraint  promises,  the  restrictiveness  depends  on  the 
precise  nature  of  the  undertakings,  the  degree  to  which 
they  are  respected,  trade  conditions  in  the  importing 
country,  etc.  Although  voluntary  exports  restraints  and 
organised  marketing  arrangements  have  multiplied  in  recent 
years  they  have  mostly  only  slowed  the  progress  of  foreign 
penetration  in  the  importing  markets  or  altered  its  pattern; 
either  other  suppliers  have  taken  the  place  of  those 
directly  affected  or  the  penalized  exporters  have  succeeded 
through  selling  upmarket  products  and  gained  in  price  terms 
a  part  of  or  all  that  they  were  losing  on  quantity.  Consider-
ing  further  that  export  restraints  tend  to  raise  prices 
charged  by  exporters,  the  real  burden  of  such  limitations 
is  falling  to a-considerable  extent  on  the  consumers  of 
importing  countries  rather  than  on  the  exporters. 
Contrary  to  the  30's,  flows  of  trade  have  seldom  been  actually 
cut  back  from  levels  reached.  The  "Maginot  lines"  set  up 
by  importing  countries  have  frequently  been  no  more  successful 
than  the  original,  mostly  not  because  the  authorities  of 
the  importing  countries  did  not  realize  (hat  the  protection 
was  not  watertight,  but  because  the  Government  concerned 
considered  that  the  degree  of  restraint  thus  introduced 
were  enough  to  keep  the  domestic  pressures  they  were  subjected 
to  at  bay.  Many  measures  have  been  ~  kind  of  placebo  to  operate 
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on  the  psychology  of  the  pressure  groups.  The  criticism  of 
those  atfected  nevertheless  remains  valid,  when  one  looks  at 
the  situation  in  terms  of  the  "fair"  trade  that  might  have 
taken  place  in  the  absence  of  these  measures  but  an  objective 
analysis  would  hardly  conclude  that  markets  have  been  closed. 
Many  exporting  countries,  including  a  number  suffering  from 
great  indebtedness  problems,  have  hardly  been  affected  by 
the  recent  protectionist  trends,  although  several  of  them 
have  been  hard  hit  by  a  spate  of  stiff antidumping  and  counter-
vailing  duties  to  resist  unfair  trade  practices.  But  claims 
about  the  terrible  impact  of  new  protectionism  can  frequently 
be  attributed  to  the  universal  tendency  of  politicians  to  find 
external  scapegoats  for  domestic  ills.  And  there  is  also 
the  understandable  dramatisation  of  the  recent  trends  by 
those  responsible  for  maintaining  liberal  trade  in  order  to 
heighten  resistance  to  protectionism;  in  the  words  of 
Arthur  Dunkel,  Director  General  of  G.A.T.T.  "frightening  people 
for  their  own  good". 
This  analysis,  that  the  recent  drift  into  protectionist 
measures  has  not  been  so  intense  as  is  often  claimed,  seems 
to  be  supported  by  the  fact  that  whilst  no  major  liberal-
ization  measures  have  recently  been  taken [though  one  could 
merely  mention  in  passing  the  application  on  1/1/84  of  the 
fifth  of  the  eight  cuts  of  Tokyo  Round  tariff  reductions/ 
the  volume  of  world  trade  in  the  first  half  of  1984  was  running 
9  percent  above  the  first  half  of  1983,  a  rate  of  growth 
well  above  that  of  world  output.  As  the  1984  G.A.T.T.  report  ~ 
states,  it  was  external  demand  which  was  the  main,  often 
the  only  stimulus  to  output  in  1983  in  industrial  countries 
other  than  the  U.S.,  Germany  and  the  U.K.,  and  in  several 
developing  countries. 
• • I •• 
What  has  happened  since  world  war  II - 7  -
What  has  happened  since  world  war  II  is  that  world  trade 
has  been  growing  much  faster  than  the  rate  of  growth  of 
world  G.N.P.  The  share  of  trade  in  the  economies  of  almost 
all  industrialized  countries  has  doubled  since  1973,  the 
year  of  the  launching  of  the  Tokyo  Round.  This  has  been 
made  possible  by  trade  liberalization,  falling  transportation 
costs,  improved  communications  which  have  lowered  barriers 
and  increased  receptivity  to  foreign  goods.  Foreign  trade 
has  now  become  highly  sensitive  to  changes  in  national  and 
international  economic  conditions. 
In  sum,  the  trading  environment  has  changed,  from  a  persistent 
trend  towards  freer  trade  until  the  late  70's,  to  a  situation 
of  strong  protectionist  pressures  and  a  number  of  protect-
ionist  measures,  more  particularly  directed  against  Japan 
and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  against  some  of  the  newly  indust-
rialising  countries.  Most  of  these  countries  maintain  highly 
protectionist  policies  themselves,  even  in  areas  where  their 
export  performance  is  strong.  In  fact,  international  trade 
rules  apply  only  to  industrialized  countries  while  all  the 
others,  regardless  of  their  stage  or  rate  of  development 
remain  substantially  and,  apparently,  indefinitely  free  of 
international  disciplines •. 
* 
*  * 
What  then  are  the  causes  of  these  heavy  strains  on  commercial 
policies  ? 
Among  the  more  general  causes  for  this  trend  one  can  mention 
that  in  democracies  Governments  have  today  come  to  be  regarded 
by  their  electorate  as  responsible  for  economic  welfare. 
Indeed  in  recent  years  results  of  elections  in  democratic 
nations  have  increasingly  been  influenced  by  economic  growth 
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and_employment  performance.  This  affects  the  behaviour  of 
politicians  and  thus  of  Governments.  High  levels  of  unemploy-
ment  ar~  an  extremely  important  source  of  protectionist 
pressures.  The  recent  record  levels  of  unemployment  in  the 
developed  world  have  contributed  greatly  to  new  protection. 
In  this  respect,  political  muscle,  i.e.  voting  power  related 
to  the  number  of  jobs  at  stake,  matte~ more  than  econom;c 
misery  in  winning  protection.  Unemployment,  apart  from  its 
impact  on  the  outcome  of  elections,  also  constrains  budgetary  ~ 
policies,  because  of  the  heavy  cost  of  unemployment  allow-
ances  and  the  loss  of  taxation  and  social  security  income. 
The  margin  of  man~uvre of  Government  is  considerably  smaller 
when  unemployment  exceeds  say  10  r.. 
The  increasing  opennes  of  the  economies  of  developed  countries, 
further  reduces  the  scope  for  effective  macroeconomic  demand 
management  at  the  national  level.  Except  in  the  U.S.,  general 
expansionary  policies  lead  almost  immediately  to  rapidly 
unsustainable  current  account  deficits.  This  induces  govern-
ments  to  prefer  sectoral,  regional  and  industrial  policies 
to  preserve  growth  and  employment.  Hence  the  deep-seated 
temptation  to  resort  to  state  intervention  and  more  specifi-
cally  direct  and  indirect  subsidization  and  measures  at  the 
border. 
There  is  another  development  which  complicates  the  handling 
of  commercial  policies.  It  has  to  do  with  the  changing  nature 
of  "comparative  advantage"  where  some  quiet  shifts  have 
been  taking  place.  No  Longer  do  endowments  in  Land,  mineral 
resources,  labour  and  capital  determine  a  nation's  comparative 
advantage  to  the  degree  they  once  did.  Even  agriculture  and 
fishery  have  become  more  "industrial".  Rather  it  is  the 
ability  to  adapt  and  use  technology  for  the  development  of 
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new~ products  and  new  methods  of  production  of  goods  and 
services.  Technology,  scale  of  production  and  specialization 
increasingly  influence  international  trade  competitiveness. 
There  is  now  a  greater  convergence  in  the  potential  structure 
of  production  in  the  more  advanced  countries  so  that  natural 
factors  are  less  successful  in  determining  competitivity 
and  in  insulating  countries  from  foreign  competition. 
Comparative  advantage  instead  of  being  "natural"  has  mostly 
become  "acquired".  In  a  world  where,  for  a  broad  range  of 
products  and  services,  allocation  of  comparative  advantage 
has  become  more  arbitrary  and  more  rapidly  shifting,  the 
struggle  for  each  country  to  maintain  for  its  industries 
its  share  in  world  trade  has  heightened  and  the  tendency  to 
intervene  has  correspondingly  increased. 
In  the  last  decade,  disorderly  behaviour  of  the  exchange 
markets  have  become  another,  major  source  of  protectionist 
pressures.  Financial  and  monetary  tensions  have  been  putting 
great  stresses  on  the  world  trading  system.  Major  movements 
in  real  exchange  rates,  only  partly  or  not  at  all  related  to, 
shifts  in  balances  of  payments,  have  changed  radically  the 
competitiveness  of  some  countries'  goods  relative  to  those 
of  other  countries.  At  pre~ent  it  is  the  U.S.  dollar  which 
is  seriously  misaligned  vis-a-vis  european  currencies  and 
less  so,  in  relation  to  the  yen.  During  an  electoral  year, 
this  misalignment,  notwithstanding  a  robust  recovery  and 
an  unexpected  drop  in  unemployment,  has  given  rise  to  a 
surge  of  protectioni& pressures  in  the  u.s.  The  value  of 
the  yen  on  the  other  hand  remains  relatively  low,  probably 
to  a  substantial  extent  because  of  considerable  exports  of 
capital. 
Three  or  four  years  ago  the  situation  was  the  other  way  round 
the  U.S.  dollar  exchange  rate  ~as undershooting,  several 
• • I • • 
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European  currencies  were  extremely  strong.  Some  countries 
particularly  the  United  Kingdom  and  France  experienced  a 
rapid  surge  of  imports  from  the  U.S.  in  certain  product  areas 
such  as  that  of  man-made  fibers  and  fabric.  During  those 
years,  a  number  of  firms  in  this  sector  went  bankrupt  because 
of  the  abnormal  import  flow.  If  some  inefficient  enterprises 
deserved  to  disappear,  a  number  of  others  failed  on  account 
of  the  temporary  aberrations  of  exchange  rates. 
The  successive  bouts  of  overshooting  and  undershooting  change 
patterns  of  international  trade  in  a  manner  that  cannot  be 
maintained  in  the  long  run.  They  have  a  ratchet  effect 
because  protectionist  measures  taken  under  pressure  tend 
to  last  while  the  rollback  pressures  of  undershooting 
exchange  rates  are  not  powerful  enough  to  induce  unilateral 
liberalization.  While  the  present,  unsustainable,  Level  of 
the  dollar  is  having  strong  positive  growth  effects  in  a 
number  of  countries,  particularly  in  Canada,  Japan  and  the 
Far  East  where  the  American  market  looms  large  in  the  geo-
graphical  export  pattern,  this  is  less  true  in  Europe  where 
the  share  of  exports  going  to  the  U.S.  is  much  smaller 
(some  15  %  for  the  E.E.C.).  For  us  the  level  of  the  dollar 
adds  to  inflationary  pressures  (e.g.  because  of  oil  and 
commodity  trading)  and  high  real  interest  rates  in  the  U.S. 
with  consequent  outflow  of  capital  dampen  the  recovery. 
Monetary  flows  nowadays  dwarf  trade  and  services  flows 
and  thereby  affect  exchange  rates  in  decisive  ways.  Nothing 
much  can  be  done  about  it, certainly  not  in  the  short  term. 
Central  Bank  intervention  can  at  the  most  slightly  discourage 
the  ardour  of  speculators.  Capital  controls  or  taxes  such  as 
interest  equalization  taxes  on  loans  are  not  practicable. 
• • I  • • 
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The  difficulty  in  tackling  this  issue  stems  in  part  from 
the  fact  that  trade  and  financial  issues  are  addressed 
largely~in  isolation  from  each  other,  both  within  govern-
ments  and  at  the  international  level.  While  institutions 
such  as  the  I.M.F.  and  the  World  Bank  feel  free  to  prescribe 
"desirable"  trade  policies,  the  G.A.T.T.  by  and  large  has 
so  far  failed  to  grasp  the  crucial  importance  of  excha~e 
rate  misalignments  for  trade  policy.  Obviously  the  solution 
to  the  trade  distortions  caused  by  exchange  rate  volatility 
does  not  lie  in  resort  to  trade  protectionis~.  Rather  it 
lies  in  general  economic  policies  and  importantly  also  in 
improvements  in  the  monetary  system  where  they  are  largely 
overdue. 
There  is  in  reality  no  monetary  system.  The  world's  exchange 
rate  system  ought  to  facilitate  the  expansion  of  world 
trade  and  investment.  Today  the  non-system  encourages  the 
opposite  as  the  internation~l  price  me~hanism sends  out  . 
wrong  signals  for  the  international  division  of  labour. 
There  is  simply  an  unstable  non-system  or  at  most  a  commun-
ication  system  between  Ministers  of  Finance,  Central  Banks 
and  international  monetary  institutions.  The  goal  should  be 
to  avoid  "incorrect  rates"  rather  than  to  try  to  maintain 
"correct"  rates. 
Finally,  pressure  for  protectionist  relief  also  stems  from 
the  rising  number  of  newly  industrialized  countries  which 
have  succeeded  in  developing  export  industries  and  in 
establishing  themselves  on  world  markets.Exceptionally  rapid 
growth  of  exports  of  these  countries,  often  in  sensitive 
sectors,  has  continued  unabated.  To  take  the  example  of 
South  Korea,  Hong-Kong  and  Taiwan,  expressed  in  U.S.  dollars 
with  base  year  1975  = 100,  the  export  index  in  value, 
disregarding  inflation,  in  1983  stood  at  481  for  South  Korea, 
368  for  Hong-Kong  and  471  for  Taiwan. 
• • I •• 
This  is  in  itse~f evidence - 12  -
This  is  in  itself evidence  that  world  markets  are  not  as 
closed  as  too  frequently  asserted.  What  has  happened  is 
that  along  with  the  rising  cost  of  labour  associated  with 
industrialization,  the  protectionist  measures  adopted 
against  these  countries  have  prompted  them  to  diversify  their 
exports. 
In  sum,  the  agitation  about  protectiont~m  in  trade,  parti-
cularly  as  it  is  voiced  by  those  responsible  for  monetary 
affairs  and  macroeconomic  policies,  is  partly  misdirecting 
the  attention  to  a  symptom,  while  failing  to  attack  the 
malady  itself. 
* 
*  * 
The  real,  rather  more  permanent,  threat  for  the  future  lies 
not  so  much  in  the  classical  and  not  so  classical  measures 
such  as  export  restraints.  The  danger  comes  from  the  tempt-
ation  to  use  the  increasing  complexity  of  regulations  imposed 
on  safety,  health,  environmental  and  other  justified grounds 
for  protectionist  purposes.  This  also  applies  to  the  services 
sector.  Traditional  regulation  will  make  it difficult  to 
deal  with  obstacles  in  this  field.  How  does  one  distinguish 
between  restrictions  which  are  perfectly  justified  from  those 
that  are  just  there  for  protectionist  reasons  ?  Then,  in 
addition  to  state-trading  and  state  monopolies,  which  tend 
to  remove  trade  from  any  internationally  agreed  rules,  there 
is  also  the  rapid  growth  in  the  size  of  government  procure-
ment,  not  only  in  the  military  area.  Experience  shows  that 
genuine  competition  in  this  field  requires  not  simply  inter-
national  regulation  and  disciplines,  but  more  importantly 
a  change  in  the  behaviour  of  human  beings.  That  is  much  more 
difficult. 
• • I  • • 
What  has  also  charact~rized - 13  -
What  has  also  characterized  the  recent  past  is  the  prolifer-
ati~n of  subsidies  to  support  ailing  firms.  In  Western  Europe 
these  m~stly  come  straight  from  the  State  budget.  In  some 
other  countries  the  subsidization  has  mostly  been  indirect 
through  generous  investment  tax  credits  and  in  particular 
tax  systems  which  permit  money  making  firms  to  reduce  their 
tax  bill  by  taking  over  tax  credits  from  money-losing  firms, 
thereby  allowing  both  to  improve  their  financial  situation. 
However  subsidization  is  subject  to  constraints,  and  that 
for  two  reasons.  First,  with  the  present  unsustainable 
budgetary  deficits,  public  funds  are  running  out  in  most 
countries  and  secondly,  pressure  against  subsidies  is  building  P 
up  from  competing  firms  which  do  not  benefit  from  the  state 
aids.  In  subsidization,  the  worst  is  probably  behind  us. 
* 
*  * 
What  are  the  specific  macroeconomic  problems  which  beset 
the  European  Community  and  which  have  added  to  the  protect-
ionist  pressures  ? 
The  present  predicament  of  Europe,  more  particularly  of  the 
Community,  mainly  stems  from  wrong  economic  and  budgetary 
policies  in  the  70's.  Generous  social  security  has  made 
labour  markets  rigid  to  a  degree  that  has  contributed  to 
high  unemployment.  The  major  fault  was  a  general  tendency 
to  be  too  optimistic,  to  assume  that  the  economic  conditions 
of  the  previous  decades  would  continue  indefinitely.  Interest 
rates  were  low  or  even  negative,  access  to  cheap  capital 
was  easy.  Labour  priced  itself out  of  jobs.  Investment  and 
profits  flows  were  sacrificed to  the  benefit  of  consumption • 
• • I •• 
Budgets  went  astray. 
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In  Europe  there  is  excessive  "cradle  to  grave  security" 
whereas  ~n the  other  hand,  in  the  U.S.  given  its  wealth 
there  may  be  somewhat  too  much  of  a  "hire  and  fire"  mental-
ity,  which  gives  rise  to  social h.a_rdships  for  those  that 
cannot  stand  the  extreme  contest  of  "survival  of  the  fittest". 
In  the  Community  certainly  there  has  to  be  a  better  balance 
between  the  twin  requirements  of  economic  growth  for  society 
and  economic  security  for  individuals.  Europe's  recent  modest 
economic  recovery  has  taken  place  despite  tight  fiscal 
policies  and  the  foreign  account  is  in  small  surplus.  America's 
take-off  has  depended  partly  on  unsustainable  growth  of  the 
federal  budget  deficit. 
Painful  restructuring  or,  more  bluntly,  contraction,  of 
traditional  industries  has  been  going  on.  The  steel,  textile 
and  clothing  and  shoe  industries  have  been  adjusting  down-
wards.  This  has  translated  itself  in  frightening  figures 
for  unemployment  - roughly  12  million  or  11  %of  the 
Community  work  force. 
In  textiles  and  clothing,  employment  has  been  falling  between 
1973  and  1982  by  39%  (textiles)  and  37%  (clothing)  respect-
ively  and  this  fall  has  con~inued  in  1983  where  textile 
employment  dropped  by  a  further  3  % and  clothing  production 
by  another  2  %  from  1982  levels.  In  absolute  terms  that  means 
that  textiles  and  clothing  employment  in  the  community  fell 
from  roughly  3  million  employees  to  1.8  million  at  the  end  of 
1983.  The  Communities  shoe  industry  too  saw  a  significant 
decline  in  terms  of  employment  at  a  rate  of  about  2  % a  year. 
In  steel  the  figure  has  been  6  to  7%  per  annum.In  shipbuilding 
there  has  been  a  contraction  of  about  50  % in  5  years.  In 
agriculture  the  total  loss  between  70  and  83  ~as  33  %.  The 
Community  has  not  been  going  on,  as  has  sometimes  been  said, 
with  its  merry  ways. 
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In  the  Community - 15  -
In -t he  Communi t y,  progress  i s  being  made  to  l a y  t he  found-
ations  !or  sustained  growth.  Inflation  and  budget  deficits 
are  down.  But  we  are  not  immune  against  the  effects  of 
policies  of  the  others.  Of  particular  concern  at  present 
are  the  excessive  real  interest  rates  which  are  directly 
affecting  economic  activity,  producing  distortions  of 
exchange  rates  and  capital  flows  and  exacerbating  indebted-
ness  problems. 
On  the  whole,  the  Community's  performance  in  the  matter  of 
protectionism  during  the  recession  stands-up  well.  It  is 
true  that  the  particular  problem  in  trade  relations  with 
Japan  and  the  Community's  enormous  bilateral  trade  deficit 
with  that  country  has  necessitated  certain  corrective  measures. 
The  same  kind  of  problem  has,  of  course,  arisen  in  the  U.S. 
and  some  other  countries.  But  apart  from  this  there  has 
been  relatively  little  recourse  to  additional  protection. 
Conclusion 
There  are  no  grounds  to  be  complacent  about  success  in 
opposing  protectionism.  Likewise  there  are  no  grounds  for 
pessimism.  The  "rising  tide"  of  world  trade  is  far  stronger 
than  any  "rising  tide"  of  protectionist  measures.  I  do  not 
share  the  view,  which  the  annual  G.A.T.T.  report  seems  to 
imply,  that 'trade  policy  discipline  has  deteriorated  to  a 
point  at  which  protection  becomes  easily  available  to  almost 
any  industry  anywhere".  In  the  developed  world  at  least, 
national  administrations  dealing  with  trade  policy  are 
generally  composed  of  men  who  know  what  Ricardo  said.  Many 
of  them,  in  the  words  of  the  Wall  Street  Journal,  wear  Adam 
Smith  neckties.  There  is  also  a  large  basis  of  mutual  trust 
between  the  major  actors  on  the  world  trading  scene·  which 
has  and  will  continue  to  prevent  disputes  from  escalating 
into  trade  wars. 
• • I •• 
In  recent  years  in  the  OECD, 
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In  recent  years  in  the  O.E.C.D.,  the  Western  Summits  and 
other  f~ra, there  has  been  a  long  series  of  solemn  communiqu~s 
and  lofty  commitments  to  a  standstill  on  protectionist 
measures  and  to  liberal  trade.  These  declarations  serve  a 
useful  purpose  in  that  they  can  be  quoted  against  protect-
ionist  lobbies.  But  it  would  be  highly  desirable  that  action 
be  more  compatible  with  the  words  - and  if that  is  not 
possible  then  the  advice  should  be  to  refrain  from  repeating 
so  often  aspirations  that  are  in  stark  contrast  to  what  is 
feasible  and  realistic.  For  not  only  is  the  credibility of 
those  who  subscribe  to  these  statements  at  stake,  but  what 
is  worse,  the  str~thened resistance  to  protectionist 
measures  which  is  expected  to  result  from  such  collective 
commitments  fades  away.  The  desirable  and  effective  kinds 
of  international  undertakings  are  those  which  go  somewhat 
further  than  G6vernments  consider  they  can  achieve  so  that 
they  may  influence  behaviour.  But  commitments  which  go 
so  much  beyond  what  is  realistic  that  they  lack  credibility 
and  therefore  efficacity  should  be  avoided. 
More  important  than  statements  is  collective  action  in 
macroeconomic  policy-making  and  systemic  changes  in  the 
monetary  and  financial  fields  to  support  the  recovery.  That 
is  a  basic  requirement  for  world  trade  to  expand.  Economic 
growth  facilitates  the  adjustment  process  in  the  developed 
world.  In  turn,  this  helps  the  developing  countries  to 
expand  their  export  receipts.  Sustained  growth  will  require 
protectionism  to  be  kept  under  control  and  further  efforts 
to  be  made  to  liberalize  trade.  The  recent  increase  in 
"managed  trade"  may  have  been  inevitable  during  the  recession 
and  even  helpful  sometimes  to  avoid  more  serious  havoc  to 
~--· 
:";• 
the  trading  system.  But  the  time  has  come  to  counter  protectionisM: 
by  initiating  the  preparations  of  new  trade  negotiations  ~ 
-not necessarily  one  massive  big  round  of  the  earlier  kinds 
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but  perhaps  through  other  for~ulas. 17  -
but~perhaps  through  other  formulas.  The  process  of  multi-
lateral  ~egotiation being  by  its  very  nature  complex  and 
time  consuming,  the  preparations  should  start  so  that  when 
the  world  economy  regains  its  health  and  strength  and  when 
the  financial  and  monetary  situation  improves,  negotiations 
are  not  delayed  by  the  lack  of  preparation.  Common  effor.ts 
to  liberalize  trade  will  then  provide  a  counterweight  to 
protectionist  pressures  and  should  thus  help  to  keep  world 
markets  open,  contributing  thereby  to  the  convalescence  of 
the  patient.  In  such  a  new  round  a  substantial  input  will  be 
required  on  the  part  of  the  successful  newly  industrialized 
countries. 
Finally,  a  broader  consideration  :  free  trade  is  not  an  end 
in  itself  but  rather  a  means  towards  increased  welfare 
- not  only  in  material  terms  - all  around.  It  is  this 
objective  which  is  fundamental  and  when  deviations  occur 
they  should  be  kept  at  the  minimum  with  the  basic  consider-
ation  of  human  welfare  as  a  guideline. 
This  statement  should  not  be  construed  as  a  defence  of 
the  recent  trend  to  protectionism.  It  is  merely  an  attempt 
to  set  the  record  straight.  The  resistance  that  has  been 
offered  to  the  pressures  augurs  well  for  the  future.  But 
this  statement  is  intended  to  be  a  warning.  If  macroeconomic 
policies  do  not  improve  and  exchange  rates  continue  to 
behave  in  grossly  distorted  ways,  the  worst  could  still 
happen. 
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